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Abstract
This paper studies the apparent inconsistency between the evolution
of GDP per capita and real wages in pre-industrial Europe. We show that
these two measures will diverge when any of the three following factors
are present: changes in income distribution, changes in labour supply per
capita and changes in relative prices. We propose a methodology for
measuring the e⁄ects of these three factors and apply it to the case of
18th century England. For this particular episode the gap between the
growth of GDP per capita and real wages can be successfully explained
and the main explanatory factor is changes in labour supply per capita.
Some further conclusions are drawn from the experience of England during
the 19th century and Europe during the early modern period.
1 Introduction
How are we to regard the evolution of economic well-being over the pre-industrial
period? Were pre-industrial economies stuck in a long term equilibrium char-
acterized by a level of economic well-being that showed no trend over several
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1centuries? Or did pre-industrial economies experience sustained growth which,
despite much slower rates than the ones we are currently used to, cumulates over
the course of the centuries in large and signi￿cant gains in living standards?
These di¢ cult questions have occupied social scientists at least since the
work of Adam Smith and Thomas Malthus. Unfortunately, notwithstanding
a large and insightful literature, we seem to be as far from a consensus today
as two centuries ago. An important reason for this is the fact that di⁄erent
measures of economic well-being seem to tell surprisingly di⁄erent stories about
pre-industrial economies. Thus, what one believes will be inevitably conditioned
by what measure one is ready to trust.
The measures of economic well-being for which we have long time series
extending well before the 19th century are essentially two: the real wage and
GDP per capita1. Each one of them can claim a long history of scholarly e⁄ort
and important improvements in their methodologies over time, and surprisingly,
each one of them shows a very di⁄erent trend over the pre-industrial period.
Real wage estimates show a consistent picture of no positive trend over the
centuries going from the late middle ages to the industrial revolution. Authors
have computed real wage series for several European countries and cities and,
more recently, for some non-European societies2. The most common outcome
of these estimates is actually a net fall in real wages between the Renaissance
and the Industrial Revolution. Only the most successful European economies,
namely England and the Netherlands, are able to maintain their real wages
over this period. No persistent positive trend is to be detected over the six
1There are other, less direct, indicators of well-being for which we have more sparse data;
for example data on people￿ s height and probate inventories.
2The seminal reference is Phelps Brown and Hopkins (1981). More recent contributions
that we will be using are Allen (2001), Clark (2005, 2006) and van Zanden (1999). For recent
estimates of real wages in pre-industrial Asia see Allen (2005) and Allen et al. (2005).
2centuries preceding the Industrial Revolution in any European country. This
description is remarkably consistent across the estimates of di⁄erent authors,
allowing for relatively modest quantitative di⁄erences. Thus, the picture that
emerges from the real wage literature is clearly one of a stagnant or even falling
level of economic well-being over the pre-industrial period.
Estimates of GDP and GDP per capita over the pre-industrial period have
been done for fewer countries and extend over a shorter time interval3. These
estimates have a somewhat larger degree of uncertainty than the ones of real
wages, as less work has been done on them and authors might disagree about
their values. There have been at least two attempts at summarizing the overall
picture for Europe: the work of Maddison (2001, 2003) and van Zanden (2001).
Maddison (2001) is the most optimistic of the two and has been highly
in￿ uencial. He uses available evidence augmented with some educated guesses
to conjecture that Europe￿ s GDP per capita was on a persistent positive trend
over as much as eight centuries. Even with modest growth rates this would
have implied a level of GDP per capita in 1800 Western Europe that more than
doubles its level in the late middle ages. The estimates of van Zanden (2001) are
more sobering, showing that GDP per capita growth was the exception rather
than the rule in pre-industrial Europe.
Despite these di⁄erences, both Maddison (2001) and van Zanden (2001)
seem to contradict the evidence from the real wage literature and paint a more
positive view of the evolution of economic well-being during this period.
The aim of this paper is to address this apparent inconsistency between real
wages and GDP per capita in pre-industrial Europe. We show that these two
3Estimates of the growth of GDP (or of some of its components) in the pre-industrial period
exist for Belgium (Blomme, Buist and Van der Wee 1994), the Netherlands (van Zanden 1993,
de Vries and van der Woude 1997), Spain (Yun 1994), Italy (Malanima 1994) and, particularly,
England (see the next section for references).
3measures can show persistent di⁄erences in growth rates in the presence of any of
the three following factors: (i) Changes in the share of national income allocated
to labour, (ii) Changes in the labour supply per capita, and (iii) Changes in
relative prices.
We contribute to the literature by linking the methodology used to calculate
growth rates of GDP per capita with the one used in the real wages literature.
We derive algebraically the e⁄ects of the three factors mentioned above and
apply our methodology to a particular case: England during the 18th century.
We show that changes in income distribution and in labour supply per capita
are able to explain a divergence between GDP per capita and real wages of the
same magnitude as the one observed in the data. After analyzing the case of
18th century England in detail we check that our framework is also consistent
with the English experience during the 19th century. We ￿nalize by discussing
the case of continental Europe and set a research agenda for the future.
2 GDP per capita and real wages over time
In order to explain why our measures of GDP per capita and real wages di⁄er
over time we ought to start by understanding how they are calculated.
The objective behind a calculation of GDP per capita is to quantify the
average amount of goods and services available to each person in an economy. As
we cannot sum up di⁄erent goods we proceed by creating an index of aggregate
production using the monetary value of the di⁄erent goods. Since good prices
change over time we must compromise in some way, for example by ￿xing prices
at their value at some point in time.
In this literature the most commonly adopted solution consists in ￿xing all
4prices at the level they take in some initial period called the base year. In other
words, authors use a Laspeyres index to calculate the growth of real GDP.
Let us consider an economy with n sectors, each sector characterized by a
level of production Yi;t and a price Pi;t , i = 1::n: The growth of real GDP










As is well known, this formula can be rewritten as a weighted arithmetic
average of the growth rates of each individual sector; the weights being the

















Equation (1) is the formula that authors use in practice since it accords with
the nature of the data at their disposition.
















where Nt is population at time t:
While estimates of the evolution of GDP and GDP per capita are numerous
4The ratio
Y1
Y0 is of course one plus the growth rate of Yt between periods 0 and 1; but we
will refer to it simply as the growth rate to alighten the presentation.
5from the 19th century onwards, data concerning the pre-industrial period is
much more scarce. The country that has been the object of most academic
e⁄orts is certainly England. Economic historians have made several attempts
to measure English GDP growth during the 18th century. Their aim was to ￿nd
evidence of an acceleration in growth rates that would give empirical support
to the formerly accepted view of an industrial revolution starting in England in
the 1760s5.
As an illustration, Table 1 reports the growth of GDP per capita in England
over the period 1500-1800 from Maddison (2001) and van Zanden (2001). As
we mentioned earlier, these two authors di⁄er considerably in their estimates
for other European countries but their ￿gures for England are reasonably close.
For the 18th century these authors apply equation (3) and arrive to very similar
￿gures since they use very similar sources6. For the 16th and 17th centuries the
authors could not rely upon direct measures of GDP growth and used di⁄erent
assumptions that led to di⁄erent ￿gures7. The estimates for these two centuries
are to be regarded as much more speculative than the ones for the 18th century.
Taking the ￿gures of Maddison (2001) at face value would lead us to reject
the existence of a Malthusian period in English history since the late middle
ages. Maddison (2005) goes even farther than this and claims that the belief in
a Malthusian period is false not just for England but for the whole of Europe.
Our view is that we are not in a position to make these claims based on our
5Early estimates seemed to con￿rm this prior (Deane and Cole 1962), but subsequent
revisions showed a much more progressive transition (Harley 1982, Crafts 1983).
6Both authors use Wrigley et al. (1997) for the data on population growth and the work
of N. F. R. Crafts (Crafts and Harley 1992 for Maddison, Crafts 1985 for van Zanden) for the
data on sectorial production and shares.
7Maddison (2001) ￿nds that it is "reasonable to assume that the Crafts-Harley rate of
growth of per capita income for 1700-1801 was also valid for 1500-1700" (p. 246). Van Zanden
(2001) proceeds by using the estimates of Overton and Campbell (1997) for the productivity
per capita in English agriculture. By assuming that labour productivity in the rest of the
economy was growing at a rate either equal (scenario one) or double (scenario two) of the
growth rate in agriculture he is able to construct estimates of GDP per capita that di⁄er
considerably from the ones of Maddison (2001).
6current (lack of) knowledge of GDP per capita before 1700. For the 18th century,
on the other hand, the picture seems convincing and a stagnant level of GDP
per capita can be safely rejected.
Real wages express the value of nominal wages in terms of a basket of goods
and services. If we have a time series for nominal wages, a time series for real





where rwt is the real wage, wt the nominal wage and Pt a price index.
Authors will use as a price index a geometric or an arithmetic weighted aver-
age of individual prices where the weights are the shares of each good in the
consumption basket of a typical worker. The scope of goods included in the con-
sumption basket is determined largely by data availability. Some studies have
limited themselves to just a single good (bread; or its main ingredient, wheat)
but more recent ones have included quite a comprehensive range of goods.
The literature on the evolution of real wages over time is voluminous and
can be traced back to the nineteen century. An advantage of this literature is
that it can tap into direct observations of wages and prices going back as far as
the 13th century. Research in the area is very active with new and exciting work
from Allen (2001), Clark (2005, 2006), van Zanden (1999) and the longtime
in￿ uential work of Phelps Brown and Hopkins (1981).
To illustrate the overall message of this literature, Figure 1 plots three of
the most recent estimates for the evolution of the real wage in England: Allen
(2001), Clark (2005) and Clark (2006)8. These series can be regarded as the
8Allen (2001) and Clark (2006) calculate yearly estimates of the real wage, and we add
a 25 years centered moving average to smooth out short term ￿uctuations. Clark (2005)
presents his results in decadal averages. To ensure comparability, we calculate a 20 years
moving average every ten years (for example, for 1720 we calculate the average of the decades
1710-1719 and 1720-1729).
7latest update on this type of work. While the magnitude of some of the cycles
that can be observed di⁄ers with respect to earlier series, the general picture
has remained remarkably consistent. Allen (2001) calculates the real wages for
building labourers and craftsmen, Clark (2005) also focuses on building helpers
and craftsmen while Clark (2006) studies farm workers.
As can be seen, real wages experience important upturns and downturns
over the six centuries preceding the industrial revolution but no de￿nite trend
can be detected. The general outline of this -and previous- series is as follows:
real wages are low at the beginning of the 14th century and experience a very
large increase with the advent of the Black Death in the mid 14th century. This
change is naturally explained by the scarcity of labour in England after as much
as 60% of the population was wiped out by the plague (Benedictow 2004). The
high level is maintained for about a century and starts falling as population
recovers. A new low point is found around the year 1600, roughly at a similar
level as in the pre-plague years. Real wages start to increase again from that
point. By the end of the 18th century they are somewhat higher but still below
the maximum levels reached during the 15th -16th centuries. It is only well
into the 19th century that wages ￿nally depart from this long term trap and
decidedly trend upwards.
The evolution of real wages and GDP per capita during the pre-industrial
period seem to contradict each other. Quite naturally, Figure 1 speaks for the
existence of a "Malthusian trap" in England up to the 19th century. Clark
and Hamilton (2006) present evidence supporting the existence of Malthusian
mechanisms in pre-industrial England and Clark (2005) shows that an inverse
relationship between population and real wages was very apparent until the mid
17th century.
8These di⁄erent interpretations stemming from the real wages and the GDP
per capita literatures seem hard to reconcile. Criticism has been at times severe
between these camps. De Vries (1994) warned that "The real wage indexes that
give such a sombre and static portrayal of modern purchasing power require
caution and scepticism", while Maddison (2001) states that "The tradition in
real wage measurement is quite simplistic compared with that in demography
or national accounts"9.
The approach we will follow is not to disprove one of the two estimates but to
reconcile them. As we discussed before, GDP per capita ￿gures for the pre-1700
period are not reliable enough. We will therefore concentrate on a case where
both GDP per capita and real wage estimates are on solid ground: England
during the 18th century. For this period the literature has reached what can be
called a consensus about the growth of GDP around the estimates of Crafts and
Harley (1983, 1992). These authors￿estimates are based on production data for
a large number of industries, and their numbers have been subject to scrutiny by
other researchers10. Coupled with the very reliable data on English population
from Wrigley et al. (1997), they lead to an increase of GDP per capita of 37%
9Both de Vries (1994) and Maddison (2003) have sustained their criticism of the real
wages approach by pointing out several potential shortcomings in their construction: the
representativeness of a particular type of wage earners for the whole labour force, the limited
number of items included in the price index and the large weight given to agricultural products
in it.
Without going into details, we believe that recent e⁄orts in the real wage literature have
dealt with these criticisms quite successfully. Representativeness, for instance, has been an
issue since real wage studies typically used wage quotations for a particular type of workers,
like construction workers, for availability reasons. Clark (2006), however, constructs a real
wage series for workers employed in Agriculture -the largest sector of pre-industrial economies-
and ￿nds a very similar pattern.
The number of goods included in the price index has been considerably extended to include
several types of foods and beverages, together with non-food items such as fuel, housing,
clothing and other manufactures. Allen (2001) uses 12 items to construct its price index,
while Gregory Clark expands the range to 36 items in Clark (2006) and up to 49 items in
Clark (2005).
The weight of Agricultural goods in the price index is in line with numerous studies of
workers￿expenditures for the 18th and early 19th century (see Clark 2006 and Ho⁄man et al.
2002).
10See Crafts and Harley (1992) for a discussion of the criticisms on their work and how they
revise their estimates in consequence.
9over the 18th century. How does this compares with the evolution of real wages
during the same epoch?
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the 5 series of real wages presented before
during the 18th century. We also show the evolution of GDP per capita for
comparison11. The levels of all series have been normalized to 100 in 1700.
The 5 series of real wages follow a similar pattern over the century. The ￿rst
half of the century is characterized by increasing real wages; the level around
1750 being between 10% and 20% higher than initially. The second half of the
century experiences an opposite movement, with real wages falling almost all
the way back to the level they took at the beginning of the century. Four out of
￿ve series estimate a real wage in 1800 just about 5% higher that in 1700 while
the ￿fth one estimates that the real wage in 1800 is considerably lower than
in 1700. These numbers are very much in line with earlier work: van Zanden
(1999) estimates that the real wage in England is the same in 1800 as in 1700
while Phelps Brown and Hopkins (1981) calculate an increase of 12:7% over this
period.
At ￿rst sight, there is considerable divergence with respect to GDP per
capita, which in 1800 is 37% higher than in 1700. But Figure 2 reveals some
similarities as well as di⁄erences. During the ￿rst half of the century GDP per
capita and real wages do not diverge, or at any rate not by much. Both measures
are increasing and their growth rates are not very di⁄erent. It is only during the
second half of the century that a large gap opens between them. A closer look
allows us to speculate that there are similarities during this phase as well. The
11While Maddison (2001) and van Zanden (2001) only calculate the overall growth rate of
GDP per capita over the whole 18th century, the data from Crafts and Harley (1983, 1992)
contains enough information to calculate growth rates for three subperiods: 1700-1760, 1760-
1780 and 1780-1800. We show the results of these calculations in Figure 2, more details will
be given in the next section.
10GDP per capita series is stagnant over the period 1760-1780 and resumes growth
during 1780-1800. At the same time, real wages are falling quickly during 1760-
1780 and look rather stagnant during 1780-1800. This is a surprising degree of
uniformity for series that, let￿ s not forget, have been obtained from completely
di⁄erent data sources and variables.
Having well framed the empirical problem that we will search to explain, we
turn now to a general analysis of the factors driving GDP per capita and real
wages apart from each other.
3 Explaining the di⁄erences
3.1 Comparing the construction of GDP per capita and
real wages
If the data and calculations behind the series of GDP per capita and real wages
are both correct, and for 18th century England there are ￿rm reasons to believe
that they are, then we are left with a puzzle. An increase of GDP per capita
of about a third, fast by pre-industrial standards, should not be accompanied
by a similar increases in real wages? And what are we to conclude about living
standards during this period; raising or stagnant?
We analyze the construction of these two measures and identify three factors
that can account for the observed di⁄erence. Ours is an accounting approach,
therefore the whole di⁄erence between GDP per capita and real wages would be
explained by these three factors by de￿nition. It must be borne in mind, how-
ever, that additional factors could be uncovered if the framework was modi￿ed
or some hypothesis were changed.
As mentioned earlier, the calculations of GDP per capita and real wages
11are based on di⁄erent sets of data: the ￿rst one uses data on production and
population, the second one on nominal wages and prices. But while information
on these variables can be collected independently, their values are linked since
total wage payments are a fraction of the total value of production. In what
follows we build up on this observation and make explicit the relationships
between these two measures of well-being.
Consider again an economy with n sectors, each sector producing a di⁄erent
type of good. We note sector￿ s i level of production at time t as Yi;t, the price of
its product as Pi;t, the quantity of labour employed in the sector as Li;t and the
nominal wage rate as wi;t, with i = 1::n: Total wage payments across all sectors










i=1 Pi;tYi;t is of course nothing else than nominal Gross Domestic
Production.
The only assumption that we will make is that labour is freely mobile across
sectors and as a consequence the wage rates of all sectors are equalized. i.e.








i=1 Li;t is the total labour supply in the economy.
Real wages are de￿ned as the ratio of nominal wages and an index of the




12the price index that is used is irrelevant here, we will only require it to be a
homogeneous function of degree one in all individual prices: Pt(￿P1t;:::;￿Pnt) =
￿Pt(P1t;:::;Pnt).







This formula can now be used to calculate the growth rate of the real wage

















We will rewrite this last expression by dividing and multiplying each term











































Finally, let us de￿ne pi;t =
Pi;t
Pt as the relative price of good i with respect
to the representative basket of goods. Our ￿nal expression for the growth rate



















This last expression is to be compared with the growth rate of GDP per














Equations (3) and (8) are very similar as they both include a weighted av-
erage of the growth rates in each sector of the economy. Here, however, we are
mostly interested in what di⁄erentiates them. Given (3), the growth rate of real
























This last expression has the merit of highlighting the three possible causes of
divergence between real wages and GDP per capita, given by the three fractions
multiplying
y1
y0 on the right hand side. The growth rates of these two measures
can thus di⁄er for any of the following causes:
(i) Changes in the share of total income allocated to labour, i.e. ￿1 6= ￿0:
Ceteris paribus, an increase in this share (￿1 > ￿0) implies a growth rate of real
wages larger than the growth rate of GDP per capita.
(ii) Changes in the supply of labour per capita, i.e. L1
N1 6= L0
N0: Ceteris paribus,






implies a growth rate of real
wages smaller than the growth rate of GDP per capita.
(iii) Changes in relative prices, i.e. 9i : pi;1 6= pi;0: The direction of this
e⁄ect is ambiguous, as we must have relative price appreciations in some sectors
and relative price depreciations in others. If the sectors experiencing relative
price appreciations tend to be large or are growing fast (i.e. large values of ￿i;0
or
Yi;1
Yi;0 ) then real wages will grow faster than GDP per capita. The opposite is
14true if relative price appreciations take place mostly in small sectors or sectors
growing slowly.
The ￿rst factor stresses changes in the distribution of income between labour
and all other factors of production. It should come as no surprise that increases
in the share of total income allocated to labour would tend to raise real wages
and viceversa.
The second factor highlighted is a change in the supply of labour per capita.
For a given share of labour in national income, an increase in the amount of
labour supplied would reduce the remuneration of each unit of labour; i.e. the
real wage. Notice that what is needed for the real wage and GDP per capita to
diverge is not just an increase in labour supply but in labour supply per capita.
If labour supply increased merely because of population growth (with a ￿xed
labour supply per capita) then both the real wage and GDP per capita would
fall by the same proportion (taking aggregate production as given). It is only
when the increase in labour supply is greater than the increase in population
that the two measures diverge.
This e⁄ect is closely related to Jan de Vries￿(1993,1994) concept of an "in-
dustrious revolution". According to this thesis, during the 17th and 18th century
England experienced an increase in the per-capita labour supply of peasants and
workers. De Vries cites in favor of this view an increase in the labour e⁄ort of
women and children, a reduction in leisure time and a shift in e⁄ort from domes-
tic non-marketable goods to marketable goods and proto-industrial production.
The reason behind this would be a change of workers￿preferences away from
leisure and towards the consumption of marketable goods. We will have the
occasion to come back to this issue later.
Notice that if this second explanation is important then the real wage and
15the workers￿(real) labour income are not following parallel trajectories. Indeed,
workers￿labour income would be growing faster than the real wage if the amount
of hours they supply trends upwards. In this paper we are focusing on the
evolution of real wages, but a good question would be if real labour income
would not be a more appropriate measure of economic well-being. We will not
deviate much into this matter, but let us note that while labour income measures
the amount of goods and services that a worker would be able to buy, it does
not take into account the disutility incurred in acquiring it. The real wage has
the advantage that it gives us the possibilities available to the worker by trading
his endowment of time against income. What the worker then does, how many
hours he works, is left for him to decide.
The third factor is changes in relative prices. If we imagine that workers are
"entitled" to some fraction of the value of production then changes in nominal
prices will translate into proportional changes in nominal wages. If all prices
were to increase by the same proportion ￿ (i.e. no relative price change) then
nominal wages would also increase by ￿ and the price index (provided that
it satis￿es the fundamental property of proportionality in current prices) will
increase by ￿ as well. The real wage will thus be una⁄ected. But consider
what happens in the more realistic case where the prices of di⁄erent goods
increase in di⁄erent proportions. In that case general equilibrium mechanisms
will shift labour from sector to sector to equalize nominal wages, and the ￿nal
increase in nominal wages would be somewhere in the middle of the range of
price increases. Will the real wage then be higher or lower? The answer depends
on what particular goods are more important in the price index. If the goods
whose price has seen the largest increases are the most important ones in the
price index chances are that the increase in nominal wages will not match the
increase of the index; real wages will fall. The opposite can also take place and
16lead to a rise in real wages.
It must be born in mind that our three factors are not assumed to be neither
exogenous nor independent from each other. As in any accounting framework,
they are compatible with many di⁄erent underlying models of the economy. Un-
der a certain model these factors might be jointly determined, while a di⁄erent
model could consider each factor to be exogenous and independent. Discussing
the most appropriate model for pre-industrial economies is beyond the scope of
this paper, but we should keep this issue on the back of our minds.
In what follows we put our framework to work and test its capacity to ex-
plain the intriguing divergence between GDP per capita and real wages in 18th
century England.
3.2 Application to 18th century England: the data
To explain the di⁄erence between GDP per capita and real wages in 18th century
England we start from the estimates of GDP per capita growth as calculated by
Maddison (2001) and, by taking into account the e⁄ects of income distribution,
labour supply per capita and relative prices, hope to arrive at estimates of real
wage growth in line with those of the real wage literature. If this is achieved
then our framework would prove to be able to account for the di⁄erence between
the two measures in an actual historical case.
England is almost certainly the pre-industrial economy for which we have the
richest set of information. Even for England, however, the data requirements for
a complete account of the three e⁄ects presented above are di¢ cult to comply
with. We do have good estimates on production growth per sector and on the
evolution of the English population, so GDP per capita can be calculated. To
evaluate the ￿rst two of our three factors we will present estimates for changes
17in the share of labour in total income and for the amount of labour supply per
capita. It is the evaluation of our third factor that poses most trouble since it
would require data on prices for all sectors of the economy and the information
we have concerns only two of them: Agriculture and Industry.
Two approaches are thus proposed. The ￿rst one takes all sectors of the
economy into account to calculate GDP growth and then considers the e⁄ects
of changes in income distribution and labour supply only. The e⁄ect of relative
price changes is left unexplored. The second approach is to take into account
all three e⁄ects mentioned before but to limit the construction of our measure
of GDP to the sectors of Agriculture and Industry.
The data we use is described in Table 2. Crafts (1983) and Crafts and
Harley (1992) are our sources for the growth rates of the di⁄erent sectors in the
economy and their share in GDP. As we mentioned earlier, these authors provide
estimates for three di⁄erent subperiods of the 18th century: 1700-1760, 1760-
1780 and 1780-1800. We will exploit this characteristic of the data and calculate
the growth rate of GDP per capita for the whole of the 18th century and for
each of the three subperiods. This will allow for richer comparisons with the
detailed time series of real wages, as shown in Figure 2. We will therefore try our
best to match the data from other sources with the three-period segmentation
of Crafts.
The least problematic piece of information is the one concerning the popu-
lation of England. The remarkable work of Wrigley et al. (1997) provides with
estimates of English population every ￿ve years for the period 1541-1871. We
have then no problem in choosing four points in time that correspond to the
limits of Crafts and Harley￿ s three subperiods (part b of Table 2).
The next piece of information we use pertains to the distribution of income.
18A very good source in this area is the work of Lindert and Williamson (1982,
1983). These authors use the information of the "social tables" constructed by
Gregory King for the year 1688, Joseph Massie for 1759 and Patrick Colquhoun
for 1801-1803. By adjusting some of the original estimates, most notably in what
concerns the number of poor households, they are able to provide a surprisingly
detailed description of the distribution of income in England at these points in
time. Lindert and Williamson (1983) do not provide us with estimates of the
distribution of income between labour and non-labour, so we must resort to
some additional assumption. We will consider that the income to the top 10%
of the population is a good measure for non-labour income. This assumption
calls for some further development.
We do know that the richer part of the English population during this period
received most of their income as revenues from land or capital, not from their
labour, so taking the upper part of the income distribution seems a sensible
thing to do. The question would be where to draw the line, what percentage of
the population received the income of land and capital. The data in Lindert and
Williamson (1983) gives us just two choices: the top 5% or the top 10% of the
population. Of these two we believe than 10% is the most appropriate threshold
since the share of income accruing to this part of the population is slightly
above 40%, which is in line with estimates of the part of non-labour factors
of production in total income over the last two centuries in several European
economies (see Prados de la Escosura and Roses 2003).
Part (c) in Table 2 gives the share of income of the top 10% of the population
in the years 1688, 1759 and 1801. In our calculation we will assign these values
to the years 1700, 1760 and 1800 respectively. To provide an estimate for the
year 1780 we assume that the share of labour is falling at a constant rate between
1760 and 1800. Income inequality increases considerably during the last part of
19the 18th century whereas the previous decades show less variation.
Let us consider now the evolution of the supply of labour per capita. The
best data we have on this area is the work of Voth (2000, 2001) on the pattern
of time use in England over the period 1760-1830. Voth estimates that the
number of hours worked per year increased steeply between 1760 and 1800 before
stabilizing at a high level during 1800-1830. His approach is a very original one:
he uses witnesses￿accounts from court proceedings in London and the North of
England in a similar way as contemporaneous time-budget studies use interviews
enquiring about the respondent￿ s activity at some random time in the past. He
estimates that working hours passed from 2,576 per year in 1760 to 3,328 in
1800 and that most of this change was due to an increase in the number of days
worked; the hours worked per day being relatively unchanged. Voth (2001) also
estimates the total change in labour supply taking into account not only the
increase in the number of hours worked per person but also changes in labour-
force participation and in unemployment. While these additional e⁄ects are
an order of magnitude smaller than the e⁄ect of increased hours per year we
take them into account to increase the accuracy of our calculations. In part
(d) of Table 2 we report both the number of hours worked per year and the
change in total labour supply including changes in labour-force participation
and unemployment12.
In our calculations we will assume that the labour supply per capita grew at
a constant rate over the period 1760-1800, which provides us with an estimate
for the year 1780. We still need a ￿gure for the year 1700. A good case can
be made against important increases in the number of working hours per year
12The increase of working hours per year from 2576 to 3328 represents a rise of 29.19%.
Coupled with a growth in population of 37.41% over the perid 1760-1800 this gives an increase
in total labour supply of 77.53%. The two additional e⁄ects we mention reduce this number
to 72.3%.
20prior to 1760 given the relatively low level of 2,576 working hours estimated
by Voth for this year. Here we cite two pieces of evidence pointing in this
direction. First, Scholliers (1983) estimates the number of hours worked per year
in Belgium during the 16th century at 2,800. It would be di¢ cult to accept that
Englishmen were working much less than their Belgian counterparts. Second,
Voth (2000) cites anthropological evidence on time use in "advanced sedentary
agriculture" societies and the average number of working hours stands at 10.9
per day. Assuming a 5-day week for preindustrial societies (with Sunday and
Monday free) we would arrive at 260 working days per year and therefore 2,834
hours. The number of working days is not necessarily overestimated by the
absence of religious holidays in our back-of-the-envelope calculation since the
tradition of "St. Monday" was less than universal.
It seems to us then that 2,576 hours per year is in any case not high for
pre-industrial societies and we will assume a constant labour supply per capita
over the period 1700-1760.
The last part of Table 2 presents the data on prices of agricultural and in-
dustrial goods that we will use to evaluate the third factor of our framework.
Our preferred source is Clark (2005), who provides the prices for 7 categories
of agricultural products and 5 categories of industrial products by decadal av-
erages13.
3.3 Application to 18th century England: results
The data presented in Table 2 is put to use in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 summarizes
the results from our ￿rst approach. We start by calculating the growth over each
subperiod for the ￿ve sectors of the economy identi￿ed by Crafts and Harley
13We use 20 years centered moving averages. Thus, for example, for the year 1740 we
compute the average of the decades 1730-1739 and 1740-1749.
21(1992). We then aggregate these ￿ve sectors using the weights from Table 2 and
obtain the ￿gures for GDP given in line 6. English GDP increased by 129%
over the whole 18th century.
The next line shows the evolution of England￿ s population, which was 66%
larger in 1800 than in 1700. The sixth and seventh lines allow us to calculate
the eighth one, the growth of GDP per capita. As can be noted, we reproduce
the result of Maddison with an increase of GDP per capita of 37% over the 18th
century. As we mentioned earlier, the trajectory was not an even one. GDP
per capita increased by 27.7% over the ￿rst 60 years of the century, stagnated
over the following 20 years and ￿nally increased by a further 8% in the last 2
decades.
The next two lines contain the information on the evolution of income dis-
tribution and labour supply. Line 9 gives the change in parameter ￿, the share
of labour in national income. The data from Table 1 implies that this share is
falling over the 18th century. Line 10 gives us the change in the labour supply
per capita, found by dividing the values for the total labour supply from Voth
(2001) by the population data from Wrigley et al. (1997). We recall that labour
supply per capita does not change in the period 1700-1760 by assumption. The
increase over the last 40 years of the century is, however, quite dramatic. Ac-
cording to Voth, the average person was putting 25% more working hours per
year at the end of this relatively short period.
Lines 8 to 10 allow us to apply equation (8) in order to obtain the growth
of real wages (relative prices are assumed to be constant at this point).
The resulting evolution of real wages can be followed on line 11. Our calcu-
lations show an increase of 26.8% over the ￿rst subperiod, followed by a rapid
fall of 13.7% during 1760-1780 and a more measured decrease of 6.7% during the
22last twenty years of the century. Overall, the ￿gure we obtain for the increase in
real wages over the 18th century is just 2.1%. The result is noteworthy, as this
last ￿gure is very similar to the actual estimates for the evolution of real wages
obtained by a completely independent literature. Moreover, the pattern we ob-
tain along the 18th century follows quite closely the one described in Figure
2; with real wages rising in line with GDP per capita over the ￿rst half of the
century and falling almost all the way back to their 1700 level over the second
half.
To appreciate the relative importance of changes in income distribution and
changes in labour supply we have also calculated the growth of real wages if
only one of these two factors were present. With changes in income distribution
only, real wages would grow by 28% over the century; or 9% less than GDP
per capita. With changes in labour supply per capita only, real wages would
grow by almost 10% over the century; a growth rate that is 27% below GDP
per capita. We conclude that changes in labour supply per capita are the most
important factor, accounting for three quarters of the di⁄erence between the
two measures.
So far, by taking into account two of our three factors we have been able to
explain a di⁄erence in the growth rates of our two measures of 35%, roughly in
line with the empirical estimates. This would lead us to think that our third
factor, changes in relative prices, had a net e⁄ect that was close to zero. We
turn to this question now, but treat it only partially by limiting the analysis to
the sectors of Agriculture and Industry.
The ￿rst two lines of Table 4 reproduce the growth rates of Agriculture and
Industry over each subperiod, they are the same as the ￿rst two lines of Table
3. We then aggregate these two sectors by using as weights the share of each
23sector in the sum of the two sectors. The resulting growth rates, which are given
in line 3, would correspond to the growth rate of the economy if the omitted
sectors were growing on average as fast as the sum of Agriculture and Industry.
In Crafts and Harley￿ s dataset this is not the case, though the di⁄erence is not
very large (GDP growth over the century is 113 % in Table 4, against 129 % in
Table 3)14.
With the above caveat in mind, we proceed by taking into account population
growth and calculating GDP per capita. This evolves in a similar way to that
depicted in Table 3, the growth rate during the ￿rst subperiod being smaller
now. Total growth over the 18th century is 28 % (Table 4, line 5).
Lines six and seven reproduce the values we used before for the changes
in the share of labour (￿) and labour supply per capita (L=N): The novelty
comes in lines eight and nine, which show the evolution of the relative prices of
agricultural and industrial goods. The procedure for constructing these relative
prices from the data in Clark (2005) is as follows. First, we construct an index for
Agricultural prices and another one for Industrial prices as a geometric average
of individual prices using the weights in Clark (2005). The overall price index is
a geometric average of these two indices, where the share of agricultural goods
equals 0:694, also in line with Clark (2005). Finally, we divide the sectorial price
indices by the overall price index to obtain relative prices. It is the change in
these relative prices that we report in Table 4. These calculations show that
agricultural goods become slightly cheaper with respect to industrial goods over
14Most of the di⁄erence comes from the ￿rst subperiod, 1700-1760, and in particular from
the very fast growth rate assigned to the Government sector during these years. As Crafts and
Harley (1992, p. 715) readily admit, "estimates of growth for sectors other than industry are
distinctly less reliable.", so the whole di⁄erence could be due to a measurement error. This
suspicion is made more probable by the fact that the growth rate of the Government sector is
not compatible with the constant share in GDP that Crafts and Harley assign to it. As Table
3 shows, during the period 1700-1760 the government would have grown by 211 % while the
whole economy grows by just 54 %. This would imply that the share of Government in GDP
doubles, but Crafts and Harley keep this share constant at 7 %.
24the ￿rst half of the century, but the tendency is strongly reverted over the second
half. Overall, by the end of the 18th century agricultural goods had become
dearer than industrial goods in relative terms. We cannot fail to notice that the
relative depreciation of industrial goods comes at the same time of the classical
dating of the Industrial Revolution. Such a fall in relative prices would be
exactly what we would expect in a situation of increasing supply due to an
improved productive capacity. These changes in relative prices are detrimental
to the worker￿ s real wages, as their expenditures on agricultural products are
much larger than those on industrial ones.
We apply equation (8) to obtain changes in real wages and report the results
in line 10 of Table 4. The growth rates that we obtain here are lower than those
from Table 3 mainly because the starting point for our calculations is a slower
growth rate of GDP per capita. The pattern of real wage growth is the same
as before, with gains during the ￿rst period and large losses during the last two
ones. The negative growth rate of real wages for the whole century is not of much
concern: it is caused by the exclusion of 3 sectors of the economy (Commerce,
Rent and Services, Government) with an average growth rate above the one for
Agriculture and Industry. The question that this exercise is designed to answer
is: how large was the role of changes in relative prices as compared with the
other two factors? The answer seems to be: not very large. By evaluating each
factor on its own we ￿nd that the growth rate of GDP per capita is reduced
by 3% over the century when only relative prices are taken into account, while
performing the same exercise using changes in income distribution or in labour
supply lead to reductions of 9% and 27% respectively. Thus, we speculate that
changes in relative prices played only a minor role in driving the divergence
between GDP per capita and real wages during this particular episode.
Overall, the conclusions we can draw from our empirical application are the
25following:
i) The observed di⁄erences between the growth rates of GDP per capita and
real wages during the 18th century in England can be rationalized by taking
into account the e⁄ects of changes in the distribution of income between labour
and other factors of production and changes in the supply of labour per capita.
ii) Of these two factors, changes in labour supply per capita are responsible
for about three quarters of the di⁄erence.
iii) Lack of data renders the evaluation of the importance of relative price
changes di¢ cult, but judging from an exercise where only Agriculture and In-
dustry are taken into account the e⁄ect appears to be small.
Thus, the existence of an "industrious revolution" during the second half
of the 18th century would be the main cause of the divergence between GDP
per capita and real wages. The two phenomena coincide in timing and the
magnitude of the change in working hours corresponds well to the observed
di⁄erence in growth rates, as our calculations have shown. The greater avail-
ability of labour that this change brought would have made each labour unit
cheaper, an aggregate e⁄ect that could not be predicted by individual workers.
This interpretation is plausible and has empirical sustain, but one should also
acknowledge that the whole concept of an industrious revolution is not without
critics (Clark and van der Werf 1998).
A certain number of robustness checks have been performed on the above
results. These include: changing the weight of Agricultural goods in the price
index15, using the price data from Clark (2006) instead of Clark (2005) and
15The weight used in Table 4 is at the lowest end of the estimates given by Ho⁄man et al.
(2002, Table 1) for the expenditure share of "All Food and Drink" among workers and the
poor before 1840. We experiment with the highest end of these estimates, 0.80, and found
very small di⁄erences in the outcomes.
26excluding housing prices from our calculations. Only minor quantitative changes
were observed in all these cases and we do not report the results. We also
experimented with an alternative hypothesis concerning the labour supply per
capita over the period 1700-1760. Instead of assuming it constant over this
period we hypothesized a growth rate of 0.2835% per year, half the yearly growth
rate of the period 1760-1800. This would imply that the number of hours worked
per year was just 2,173 in 1700, a ￿gure that seems too low for us. Using this
alternative hypothesis results in a much slower growth of real wages during
1700-1760 (7% instead of 26.8% under our preferred hypothesis) and therefore
a net change over the whole century of -3.9%. While this last result is not too
far away from actual estimates, we ￿nd our preferred hypothesis of no change
in hours worked prior to 1760 to be more persuasive.
3.4 Further tests with 19th century data
We have shown that the three factors identi￿ed in section 3.1 reinforce each other
in order to explain the divergence between GDP per capita and real wages in
18th century England. If our approach is correct then we would also expect the
three factors to roughly cancel each other in periods where GDP per capita and
real wages evolve similarly. It is to such a mode of assessment that we turn our
attention next, by using England during the 19th century as a case in point.
The comparative performance of GDP per capita and real wages during
the 19th century in England has raised less eyebrows than the 18th century
case. During the 19th century these two measures experienced marked accel-
erations with respect to historical standards, and their estimated growth rates
are roughly in line with each other. Table 5 presents estimates for the evolution
of real wages and GDP per capita during the 19th century. The real wage esti-
mates are the ones we have used before augmented with the ones from Feinstein
27(1998)16. The source for GDP per capita is Maddison (2003), where we have
used his estimates for the UK since separate information for England was not
given for the 19th century. We have divided the 19th century in 3 subperiods:
1800-1830, 1830-1880 and 1880-1900, re￿ ecting the availability of our di⁄erent
real wage series. We concentrate on the ￿rst two subperiods, where the number
of real wage series available is respectively six and ￿ve while the last subperiod
has only two real wage series.
As can be seen, there is a lower degree of uniformity among the real wage
estimates during the 19th century than during the 18th century. For the period
1800-1830 the total growth rate of real wages ranges from 10.6% to 34.7%. The
estimate of GDP per capita growth from Maddison is at the lower end of this
range: 10.7%. During the second period, 1830-1880, the tendency is inverted.
Real wage growth is estimated in the range from 45% to 93.5% while GDP per
capita growth stands at 98.8%. Accordingly, when we consider the period 1800-
1880 we ￿nd that the growth rate of GDP per capita (120.2%) is well within the
range of estimates for real wage growth (70.8% to 154.5%). For the last period
of the 19th century, 1880-1900, the two real wage estimates from Clark (2005)
grow by almost the same amount as the GDP per capita estimate: between 29%
and 30%.
We conclude that there is no divergence between GDP per capita and real
wages during the 19th century in England and that, if anything, the major
di⁄erences are between estimates of the real wage. Turning back to our frame-
work, we would expect that the di⁄erent forces we identi￿ed in the preceding
section roughly cancel each other. We will assess this prediction by estimating
the e⁄ects of changes in income distribution and in labour supply per capita.
16Feinstein￿ s (1998) estimates are ￿ve years centered averages, while we are presenting the
estimates of Allen (2001) and Clark (2006) as 25 years centered averages and those of Clark
(2005) as 20 years centered averages.
28We will leave the third explanatory factor, changes in relative prices, outside of
the equation. While we cannot be sure that their role will be as small as during
the 18th century their inclusion would require price information that we do not
have.
Table 6 presents our estimates for the two e⁄ects mentioned above. For
changes in income distribution we take the same approach as before and assume
that the share of income to the top 10% of the population is a good index
for the share of non-labour income. Lindert and Williamson (1983) provide
￿gures for two time points in the 19th century, 1867 and 188017. As these
two authors describe, the 19th century witnessed important increases in income
inequality. We calculate the divergence between GDP per capita and real wages
that these changes would create. As Table 6 shows, the e⁄ect of changes in
income distribution would be to lower the growth rate of real wages with respect
to GDP per capita by 10.4% if we use the 1867 ￿gure and by 12.1% is we use
the 1880 ￿gure.
What about the evolution of labour supply per capita during the 19th cen-
tury? As Voth (2000) documents, the period 1800-1830 probably represents
the peak in terms of working hours during all of English history. Somewhere
during the 19th century the English working year started to shorten in a sec-
ular change that came to an end only in the last quarter of the 20th century.
Voth (2000, p.268) gives us the ￿gure of 2,807 worked hours per year for 1890,
which represents a large fall with respect to his estimate for 1800. In Table
6 we calculate the e⁄ect that this decrease in labour supply per capita would
have on the di⁄erence between real wages and GDP per capita (unemployment
17The ￿gure for 1867 is from the calculations "with paupers" and is therefore comparable
with the one for 1801. The ￿gure for 1880, on the other hand, is only available in the
calculations "without paupers" and for the UK instead of England and Wales. This ￿gure
can thus be considered as slightly underestimated.
29and labour force participation are assumed to be constant). By itself, this e⁄ect
would imply a growth rate of real wages 18.6% higher than the one of GDP per
capita.
If we put these two e⁄ects together, using the ￿gure for 1880 from Lindert
and Williamson (1983), we arrive at a di⁄erence of just 4.2% in favor of real
wages. The two e⁄ects are of similar magnitude and opposite direction, and
they almost cancel each other. While these calculations are not to be taken as
the last word on the subject, they do reassure us on the validity of our approach.
The prediction that the di⁄erent e⁄ects should be close to cancelling each other
is borne out by the facts; real wages during the 19th century were slowed down
by the raising income inequality but this was countered by the relative scarcity
of labour that a shorter working year brought up.
4 Continental Europe and future research agenda
The evolution of living standards and economic well-being over the pre-industrial
period is a huge research area where our questions easily outnumber our answers.
This paper addresses one of such questions: why are estimates of GDP per
capita and real wages over the pre-industrial period seemingly contradicting
each other? We hope to have contributed to the literature on two di⁄erent
levels. On a theoretical level, we have o⁄ered an accounting framework that
duly decomposes the di⁄erence between GDP per capita and real wages into
three components: changes in income distribution, labour supply per capita and
relative prices. We believe that this framework can help to put more order in
our way to approach this question and make us appreciate that GDP per capita
and real wages will perform di⁄erently if the economy experiences these types
of changes. The attention of the researcher can then be focused on looking for
30evidence of these changes.
On an empirical level, we have used our framework to account for the diver-
gence between GDP per capita and real wages in 18th century England. The
result was successful, the measured changes in income distribution and, spe-
cially, labour supply per capita are of the right order of magnitude to account
for the observed divergence. Thus, di⁄erent evolutions of GDP per capita and
real wages over the pre-industrial period do not have to be contradictory; they
might be the logical consequence of changes in the economy.
Our appraisal of the evolution of economic well-being during the 18th century
in England should re￿ ect the ￿ndings of this paper. While "stagnant" would
certainly be inappropriate for an economy whose GDP per capita grows by a
third, our assessment must be tempered by the modest performance of real
wages. The growth in production was more bene￿cial to the owners of land
and capital than to the suppliers of labour. While these last ones did see their
overall income increase, this was achieved essentially through longer work.
The experience of England during the 19th century also corroborates our
methodology. During this century income distribution changes would have de-
pressed real wages with respect to GDP per capita. At the same time, changes
in labour supply per capita would have caused the opposite e⁄ect. The net
result, as it turns out from our calculations, would be a very similar growth rate
for both measures; which is well what estimates in the literature tell us.
The next step on the empirical side would be to try to reconcile the evolution
of GDP per capita and real wages in the rest of Europe. This is a tall challenge,
as the ￿gures in Table 7 reveal. Here we compare GDP per capita growth
estimates from van Zanden (2001) with real wage growth estimates from Allen
(2001) for six European countries for the period 1500-1820 (real wage estimates
31refer to a major city within each country). The general picture is clear: real
wages grew much slower (or decreased much faster) than GDP per capita in
all countries. This pan-European real wage underperformance during the early
modern period is puzzling and an explanation for it should be high on the
researchers￿agenda.
Would it be possible that a common force was sweeping all over Europe
during this period and causing the systematic pattern we see in Table 7? An
interesting possibility would be the existence of an "industrious revolution" tak-
ing place not just in England but in several parts of the continent, though in
di⁄erent degrees. This factor was the dominant one in our analysis of 18th
century England, and we might speculate that the English experience had some
points in common with other European countries. If the working year was pro-
gressively lengthening all over Europe between 1500 and 1820, we would expect
the phenomenon to be most pronounced in North-Western Europe and this for
at least two reasons. First, the lengthening of the working year was achieved
mostly by increasing the number of days worked through the progressive elim-
ination of religious holidays and "St. Monday". This was more likely to take
place in protestant countries, as exposed by Max Weber￿ s famous thesis on the
protestant ethic (Weber 1930). Second, the period between the Renaissance
and the Industrial Revolution saw a shift in the balance of economic power to-
wards North-Western Europe and markets became a more pervasive feature of
the economic landscape there. Our reading of Jan de Vries￿work is that one of
the main driving forces behind the "industrious revolution" in England was the
increased presence of the market as a buyer of labour and a seller of consump-
tion goods. The argument would then be that the more developed markets of
North-Western Europe would have operated a larger e⁄ect on workers there;
"pushing" them to supply more labour and consume more goods.
32If, as we suggest, the increase in labour supply per capita was more marked
in North-Western Europe our framework would predict ceteris paribus a larger
wedge between the growth rates of GDP per capita and real wages in those
countries. It is certainly too soon to make hard claims in this area, but one
cannot help to remark that this is precisely the case in the data presented in
Table 7. The di⁄erence between growth rates is largest in north-western Euro-
pean countries (108% in the UK, 74% in the Netherlands and 52% in Belgium)
and falls as we move towards the European "periphery" (38% in Italy, 39% in
Spain, 15% in Poland). It is as if the "work ethic" of protestant countries was
cruelly rewarded with a larger de￿cit of real wages with respect to GDP per
capita.
The above discussion is to be regarded as highly speculative, we have left
prudence aside for a moment and squeezed out of the data as many patterns as
possible. There is considerable uncertainty surrounding the estimates of GDP
per capita for this period, and the ￿rst task of future research should be to ex-
tend the work in this area. We need to consolidate the estimates for the countries
that are present in Table 7 and construct estimates for those that aren￿ t. France
and Germany, in particular, are two important missing countries whose GDP
per capita estimates could be readily compared with real wage estimates for
French and German cities calculated by Allen (2001). Concerning real wages,
estimates for countries other than England are relatively rare and one would
like to see Allen￿ s calculations con￿rmed by other researchers. Once we feel
more secure of the patterns of these two measures over the pre-industrial period
we can look for explanations of their eventual divergence. Changes in income
distribution and changes in labour supply per capita o⁄er the most research
bang for the buck since their e⁄ects can be applied without the need of detailed
sectorial information. If the pattern we identi￿ed in Table 7 is con￿rmed by
33future research then an explanation based on increased working e⁄orts through-
out Europe -but specially in North-Western Europe- could gain acceptance and
improve our understanding of this challenging episode of economic history.
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Table 1 
The evolution of GDP per capita in pre-industrial England 
 
  Maddison (2001)    van Zanden (2001) 








           
1500  39.5      52
*   
1600  53.8  36.2%    48  -7.7% 
1700  72.9  35.4%    76  58.3% 
1800  100  37.1%    100  31.6% 
           
Total growth 
1500-1800 
153%    92% 
*Figure is the average of the two values given for 1520. Figure 1 
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(a) Crafts (1983) and Crafts and Harley (1992) 
Annual growth rate of output per sector, in percentage 
  1700-1760 
 
1760-1780  1780-1800   
Agriculture  0.6  0.13  0.75   
Industry  0.71  1.29  1.96   
Commerce  0.69  0.64  1.38   
Rent and Services  0.38  0.69  0.97   
Government  1.91  1.29  2.11   
         
Share of sector in GDP 
  1700-1760 
 
1760-1780  1780-1800   
Agriculture  0.37  0.37  0.32   
Industry  0.20  0.20  0.25   
Commerce  0.16  0.16  0.16   
Rent and Services  0.20  0.20  0.20   
Government  0.07  0.07  0.07   
         
(b) Wrigley et al (1997) 
Population of England, in thousands 
  1701 
 
1761  1781  1801 
Population  5,210  6,310  7,206  8,671 
         
(c) Lindert and Williamson (1983) 
Share of income to the top 10% of the population (calculations with paupers) 
  1688 
 
1759  1801   
Share of top 10%   44.0  44.4  47.9   
         
(d) Voth (2001) 
  1760  1800   
Working hours per year  2,576  3,328   
Total labour supply  100  172.3   
       
(e) Clark (2005) and Clark (2006) 
Prices for 7 categories of agricultural goods and 5 categories of industrial goods, 
available for each decade of the 18
th century.  
         Table 3 
Explaining the divergence between GDP per capita and Real Wages: changes in 
income distribution and labour supply per capita 
 
line  variable  Percentage change over the period 
    1700-1760 
 
1760-1780  1780-1800  1700-1800 
1  e Agricultur   43.2 %  2.6 %  16.1 %  70.6 % 
2  Industry   52.9 %  29.2 %  47.4 %  191.3 % 
3  Commerce  51.1 %  13.6 %  31.5 %  125.7 % 
4  Rent and Services  25.5 %  14.7 %  21.3 %  74.7 % 
5  Government  211.2 %  29.2 %  51.8 %  510.5 % 
           
6  GDP  54.6 %  14.0 %  29.9 %  129.0 % 
           
7  Population  21.1 %  14.2 %  20.3 %  66.4 % 
           
8  GDP per capita  27.7 %  - 0.2 %  8.0 %  37.6 % 
           
9  Share of labour 
(α ) 
- 0.7 %  - 3.2 %  - 3.2 %  - 7.0 % 
10  Labour supply 
per capita (L/N)  0 %  12.0 %  12.0 %  25.4 % 
           
11  Real Wage  26.8 %  - 13.7 %  - 6.7 %  2.1 % 




Explaining the divergence between GDP per capita and Real Wages: changes in 
income distribution, labour supply per capita and relative prices. 
 
 
line  variable  Percentage change over the period 
    1700-1760  1760-1780  1780-1800  1700-1800 
 
1  Agriculture  43.2 %  2.6 %  16.1 %  70.6 % 
2  Industry  52.9 %  29.2 %  47.4 %  191.3 % 
           
3  GDP   46.6 %  11.9 %  29.8 %  113.1 % 
           
4  Population  21.1 %  14.2 %  20.3 %  66.4 % 
           
5  GDP per capita  21.0 %  - 2.0 %  7.9 %  28.0 % 
           
6  Share of labour 
(α ) 
- 0.7 %  - 3.2 %  - 3.2 %  - 7.0 % 
7  Labour supply 
per capita (L/N)  0 %  12.0 %  12.0 %  25.4 % 
8  Relative price of 
agriculture ( a p ) 
- 2.8 %  3.2 %  4.3 %  4.6 % 
9  Relative price of 
industry ( ind p ) 
6.7 %  - 6.9%  -9.0 %  - 9.6 % 
           
10  Real Wage  21.0 %  -16.0 %   - 9.7 %  - 7.2 % 
           
 
 
 Table 5 
Real wages and GDP per capita during the 19
th century in England. 
 
 
Source  series  Percentage change over the period 
    1800-1830  1830-1880  1800-1880    1880-1900 
Real wage estimates           
Allen 
(2001) 
Labourers  13.4%  56.8%  77.8%     
  Craftsmen 
 
20.9%  45.1%  75.4%     
Clark 
(2005) 
Helpers  31.5%  93.6%  154.5%    30.7% 
  Craftsmen 
 
34.8%  79.2%  141.5%    29.9% 
Clark 
(2006) 









           
GDP per capita estimate           
Maddison 
(2003) 
  10.8%  98.8%  120.2%    29.2% 
             
             










Changes in income 
distribution 
     
  1801  1967  1880 
Share of total income to top 
10% of the population 
47.9%  53.4%  54.2%
(1) 
    1801-1867  1801-1880   
Implied difference in growth 
rates
(2) 
-10.4%  -12.1%   
         
Changes in labour supply 
per capita 
     
  1800  1890   
Hours worked per year  3328  2807   
       
  1800-1890     
Implied difference in growth 
rates
(2) 
18.6%     
       
  1800-1880/1890   
Net effect on growth rates  4.2% 
 
 
       
       
(1):This figure corresponds to the UK. 
(2):Positive values denote that GDP per capita would grow faster, negative values denote that real 
wages would grow faster.  Table 7 
Real wages and GDP per capita in Europe, 1500-1820. 
 
 
Country  Total change, 1500-1820 
  GDP per capita 






113%  5% 
Netherlands 
 
48%  -26% 
Belgium 
 
35%  -17% 
Italy 
 
-18%  -56% 
Spain 
 
5%  -34% 
Poland  -17%  -32% 
   
Notes: GDP per capita growth between 1500 and 1820, from Table 4.3 in van Zanden (2001). For 
Spain the growth is for the period 1570-1820.  
Real wage growth is from Table 5 in Allen (2001). We calculate the growth between the average for 
1500-1549 and the average for 1800-1849. The real wages correspond to the following cities: London 
(UK), Amsterdam (Netherlands), Antwerp (Belgium), Florence/Milan (Italy), Valencia/Madrid (Spain), 
Krakow (Poland). For Spain we calculate the growth rate for Valencia between 1500-1549 and 1750-
1799 and then increase it by the growth rate for Madrid between 1750-1799 and 1800-1849. 